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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Kareem Hassan Millhouse, a prisoner at USP 
Lewisburg, appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).   
Initially, this Court must decide whether Millhouse is 
eligible for IFP status on appeal under the Prison Litigation 
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Reform Act (“PLRA”).  We conclude that he is eligible, and, 
accordingly, we grant his motion to proceed IFP on appeal.  For 
purposes of this appeal, Millhouse has only one strike.  The 
Court must look to the date the notice of appeal is filed—and 
not the date that the Court rules on a prisoner’s motion to 
proceed IFP—in assessing whether a particular dismissal counts 
as a strike.  In short, strikes that accrue before the filing of the 
notice of appeal count—while strikes that accrue after the notice 
of appeal is filed do not.  While the Bledsoe strike accrued 
before the filing of Millhouse’s notice of appeal, both Doe and 
Heath II were decided after Millhouse filed his notice of appeal. 
 However, even if we were to count Doe and Heath II (which we 
do not), Millhouse would still only have two strikes, i.e., 
Bledsoe and Doe.  Because the District Court explicitly and 
correctly concluded that Millhouse’s complaint revealed an 
immunity defense on its face and dismissed with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Doe qualifies as a 
strike.  But we also conclude that a dismissal without prejudice 
for failure to state a claim does not rise to the level of a strike.  
Accordingly, Heath II does not qualify as a strike.     
 Turning to the merits of the underlying decision by the 
District Court, we will vacate the District Court’s order and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 On August 22, 2014, Millhouse filed a pro se complaint 
against several prison employees, alleging constitutional 
violations under the Bivens doctrine.  In a May 5, 2015 order, 
the District Court denied Millhouse’s motion for leave to 
proceed IFP, dismissed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 
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without prejudice to refiling if Millhouse submits the full filing 
fee, and denied his motion for leave to amend (as well as his 
motion for a preliminary injunction and for leave to add 
exhibits).  In its accompanying memorandum, the District Court 
identified five strikes pursuant to § 1915(g) and found that 
Millhouse failed to establish that he was under imminent danger 
of serious physical injury.     
 Acting pro se, Millhouse filed a notice of appeal on May 
19, 2015.  On June 15, 2015, he moved to proceed with this 
appeal IFP.  On November 6, 2015, we stayed the instant case 
pending Millhouse v. Sage, C.A. No. 14-3845, another appeal 
filed by Millhouse.  On February 11, 2016, the Court issued its 
opinion in Sage.  In this disposition, we determined that only 
one of the putative strikes cited by the District Court actually 
qualifies as a strike:  Milhouse v. Bledsoe, No. 10-cv-0053 
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2010).1  See Millhouse v. Sage, 639 F. App’x 
792, 792-95 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).   
 While this appeal was stayed, the District Court 
considered two other pro se actions filed by Millhouse:  
Milhouse v. Heath, No. 15-cv-00468 (M.D. Pa.) (“Heath II”), 
and Milhouse v. Doe, No. 16-cv-00146 (M.D. Pa.).   
In his Heath II complaint (filed on March 9, 2015), 
Millhouse claimed that prison officials violated the Eighth 
Amendment by housing him with another inmate who posed a 
risk of danger to him.  In an October 27, 2015 order, the District 
Court stated that Millhouse’s motion to proceed IFP (construed 
                                                 
1 It appears that Millhouse has spelled his name as 
“Milhouse.”  Although the District Court also used this spelling, 
his prison records spelled his name as “Millhouse.”    
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as a motion to proceed without full prepayment of the filing fee) 
“is GRANTED,” “Milhouse’s complaint is DISMISSED 
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),” 
“[t]he Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case,” and “[a]ny appeal 
from this order will be deemed frivolous, not taken in good faith 
and lacking probable cause.”  Milhouse v. Heath, No. 15-cv-
00468, 2015 WL 6501461, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2015).  In 
its accompanying memorandum, the District Court explained 
that Millhouse did not allege any facts from which it could be 
found that he was injured by his cellmate.  “While Milhouse 
may assert that he is in danger because of the dangerous nature 
of his cellmate, this type of danger is speculative and not a basis 
for relief.”  Id. at *4.  According to the District Court, Millhouse 
also had no constitutional right to choose his place of 
confinement or his cellmate.  Given Millhouse’s failure to set 
forth any factual allegations giving rise to cognizable claims, “it 
is impossible to conclude that defendants have deprived 
Milhouse of any constitutional rights entitling him to monetary 
damages, and as stated above Milhouse has no entitlement to 
injunctive relief in the form of a transfer out of the federal 
prison system.”  Id.  “As such, the present complaint will be 
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as Milhouse 
fails to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief 
may be granted.”  Id.  The District Court further explained in its 
memorandum that the complaint would be dismissed without 
leave to amend as it would be inequitable and futile to grant 
Millhouse the opportunity to do so.  
On January 27, 2016, Millhouse filed his complaint in 
Doe against three unidentified Third Circuit judges.  According 
to Millhouse, a Third Circuit opinion falsely asserted that he had 
confessed to committing a crime, and this opinion was accessed 
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by other inmates on a law library computer, who then harassed 
and assaulted Millhouse.  In a February 24, 2016 order, the 
District Court stated that Millhouse’s motion to proceed IFP 
(again construed as a motion to proceed without full prepayment 
of the filing fee) “is GRANTED,” “Milhouse’s complaint is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),” “[t]he Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this 
case,” and “[a]ny appeal from this order will be deemed 
frivolous, not taken in good faith and lacking probable cause.”  
(A285.)  In a footnote, the District Court explained that 
Millhouse “has only named defendants who have absolute 
immunity” and that it would be inequitable to grant him an 
opportunity to file an amended complaint against those 
defendants.  (A285 n.1.)  According to the District Court’s 
memorandum, the judges were entitled to absolute immunity 
from monetary damages because Millhouse’s claims were based 
on actions taken in the exercise of their official duties.  Noting 
that Millhouse appeared to claim he was in danger of future 
assaults and sought a transfer out of the federal prison system, 
the District Court also concluded that he clearly failed to state a 
cognizable claim.  Millhouse did not allege any facts indicating 
that prison officials failed to protect him, and he also did not 
name any prison officials as defendants in his complaint.  A 
prisoner, in turn, has no justifiable expectation that he will be 
incarcerated in a particular facility.  “While there is no 
indication that Milhouse initiated this lawsuit with malicious 
intentions, the complaint is suitable for summary dismissal 
under the in forma pauperis statute because it fails to articulate 
an arguable factual or legal basis under federal law.”  Milhouse 
v. Doe, No. 16-cv-00146, 2016 WL 727619, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 
Feb. 24, 2016).  Acknowledging the general principle that 
failure to state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure is not tantamount to legal frivolity pursuant to § 
1915(g), the District Court found that “[t]he fatal defect in this 
complaint is not merely that it fails to state a claim under 
Bivens, but that it describes neither conduct nor injury that 
implicates the Constitution or other federal law.”  Id.  It insisted 
that service of process would thereby represent a waste of scarce 
judicial resources.   
The stay of this appeal was lifted on April 5, 2016.  
Subsequently, the motion to proceed IFP was referred to a 
merits panel, and the Court indicated that it would benefit from 
the appointment of counsel to address the following issues: 
(1) whether the dismissal in [Heath II] qualifies as 
a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 
compare McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 
396 (4th Cir. 2009) (cited in Ball v. Famiglio, 726 
F.3d 448, 460 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013)), with Orr v. 
Clements, 688 F.3d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 2012); (2) 
whether the dismissal in [Doe] qualifies as a 
strike; see Ball, 726 F.3d at 460-63; (3) if these 
dismissals qualify as strikes, whether their timing 
precludes Appellant from proceeding in forma 
pauperis in this appeal; (4) if this Court decides 
that Appellant has three strikes, whether he is 
under imminent danger of serious physical injury 
for purposes of § 1915(g); and (5) if this Court 
decides that Appellant qualifies for in forma 
pauperis status on appeal, whether the District 
Court’s decision on appeal should be vacated. 
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(A18-A19.)2  Millhouse did not object, and Stephen A. Fogdall, 
Esq., and Emily J. Hanlon, Esq. were appointed as his pro bono 
counsel.3 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We possess appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review with respect to the proper interpretation of the PLRA and 
its three strikes rule.  See, e.g., Ball, 726 F.3d at 455 n.11. 
III. 
 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) limits a prisoner’s ability to obtain 
IFP status: 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 
under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more 
prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in 
any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court 
of the United States that was dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 
                                                 
 2 Because we determine that Millhouse does not have 
three strikes, we need not (and do not) decide “whether he is 
under imminent danger of serious physical injury for purposes 
of § 1915(g).”   
 
3 We express our thanks to Mr. Fogdall and Ms. Hanlon 
for their excellent work in this matter.   
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serious physical injury. 
In Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013), we set forth 
our general approach for deciding what constitutes a strike under 
this provision of the PLRA: 
Thus, we adopt the following rule:  a strike under 
§ 1915(g) will accrue only if the entire action or 
appeal is (1) dismissed explicitly because it is 
“frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to state a 
claim” or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory 
provision or rule that is limited solely to 
dismissals for such reasons, including (but not 
necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Id. at 126.  
 “The ‘three strikes’ provision was ‘designed to filter out 
the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.’”  
Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015) (quoting 
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)); see also, e.g., Abdul-
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(noting that Congress enacted PLRA to limit filing of frivolous 
and vexatious prisoner lawsuits).  Partially abrogating our ruling 
in Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2013) (in which we 
held, inter alia, that a strike does not accrue until the dismissal 
has been affirmed on appeal or the opportunity to appeal has 
otherwise passed, id. at 464-65), the Supreme Court concluded 
that the refusal to treat a prior dismissal as a strike because of a 
pending appeal (at least where the prisoner is not seeking to 
appeal from a “third-strike trial-court dismissal”) would result in 
“a leaky filter,” Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1764-65.  While the 
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statutory scheme thereby seeks to reduce the likelihood of 
frivolous lawsuits (while improving the quality of the remaining 
prisoner actions), it would run counter to the PLRA’s goals if 
our approach “will inevitably lead to more, and perhaps 
unnecessary, litigation on whether or not a particular dismissal 
constitutes a strike.”  Byrd, 715 F.3d at 126.  Accordingly, the 
Byrd Court adopted a bright-line rule for this determination.  Id. 
 We did so while recognizing that, “[i]f courts are permitted to 
consider the nature of the dismissal and determine whether the 
dismissal fits within the language of § 1915(g), then there is less 
likelihood that a dismissal intended as a strike will slip through 
the cracks created by a categorical rule that bars courts from 
undertaking such an examination.”  Id.   
A. Strikes and the Notice of Appeal 
It is undisputed that, while Millhouse filed his notice of 
appeal on May 19, 2015 (and his IFP motion on June 15, 2015), 
his second and third putative strikes—Heath II and Doe—
accrued on October 27, 2015 and February 24, 2016.  On 
November 6, 2015, this appeal was stayed pending our 
disposition in Sage.  Sage was decided on February 11, 2016, 
and this Court lifted its stay on April 5, 2016.  Millhouse’s 
motion for leave to proceed with his appeal IFP still remains 
pending.  According to Appellees and Judge Ambro’s partial 
dissent and concurrence, these dismissals count as strikes for 
purposes of this appeal because they both accrued before this 
Court had granted the IFP motion.  Unlike Appellees, Judge 
Ambro believes that we should then equitably toll these two 
strikes, and he accordingly would grant Millhouse IFP status.  
However, we must look to the date the notice of appeal is 
filed—and not the date that we grant a prisoner’s motion to 
proceed IFP—in assessing whether a particular dismissal counts 
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as a strike.  Strikes that accrue before the filing of the notice of 
appeal count as strikes—while strikes that accrue after the notice 
of appeal is filed do not.  Because the second and third putative 
strikes accrued after Millhouse filed his notice of appeal, they 
could not count as strikes for purposes of this appeal.   
We begin, as we must, with the statutory language.  See, 
e.g., Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313 (“‘Our task is to give effect 
to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in 
reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive.’” (quoting Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 
U.S. 99, 104 (1993))).  Under the plain language of the PLRA, it 
is the filing of the notice of appeal that “triggers” the three 
strikes rule.  Specifically, § 1915(g) provides that a prisoner 
shall in no event “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a 
civil action or proceeding” under this section if the prisoner has, 
“on 3 or more prior occasions,” brought an action or appeal that 
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  This 
language indicates that a prisoner like Millhouse cannot “appeal 
a judgment in a civil action or proceeding” under the IFP statute 
if he or she has accrued strikes “on 3 or more prior occasions.”  
In other words, these strikes must have accrued “prior” to the 
“appeal [of] a judgment in a civil action or proceeding.”  A 
prisoner (or any other litigant) “appeal[s] a judgment in a civil 
action or proceeding” by filing a notice of appeal.  Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1) specifies that “[a]n appeal 
permitted by law as of right from a district court to a court of 
appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the 
district clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4.”  In general, 
“the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the 
district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from” (or “within 60 days” if one of the parties is the 
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United States, a United States agency, a United States officer or 
employee sued in an official capacity, or a current or former 
United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity 
for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties 
performed on behalf of the United States).  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(1); see also, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 
(2007) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case 
is a jurisdictional requirement.”).  As Millhouse aptly explains, 
“[i]t follows that a prisoner may not ‘appeal a judgment in a 
civil action or proceeding’ in forma pauperis if the prisoner has 
accrued 3 strikes prior to filing the notice of appeal.”4  
(Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4.)    
None of the cases cited by Appellees (or the partial 
dissent and concurrence) actually considered the meaning of § 
1915(g) and its “appeal a judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding” language.  Accordingly, they did not resolve the 
                                                 
 4 In fact, we have held that a notice of appeal cannot be 
rejected merely because the filing fee has not been paid.  See, 
e.g., Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 164-
65 (3d Cir. 2015).  If a notice of appeal may not be rejected on 
the basis that the litigant failed to include the requisite fee, the 
subsequent grant of an IFP application likewise should not affect 
the timing of an “appeal [of] a judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding.”  After all, the whole point of IFP status is to allow 
indigent litigants to appeal “without prepayment of fees.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(a); see also, e.g., Ball, 726 F.3d at 452 n.1 (“The 
prisoner is still required to pay the costs of her action or appeal, 
a departure from pre-PLRA practice, see Denton v. Hernandez, 
[504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992)], paying an initial partial fee followed 
by installment payments until the entire fee is paid.  28 U.S.C. § 
1915(b)(1).”). 
13 
 
specific question of whether we should look to the date of filing 
of the notice of appeal or the date that we rule on a prisoner’s 
IFP motion in assessing whether a dismissal counts as a strike.  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) provides that “any court of the United 
States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense 
of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal 
therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a 
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all 
assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay 
such fees or give security therefor.”  Relying on this provision, 
we have indicated that, when a litigant submits a complaint with 
an IFP motion, the complaint is duly filed after the motion to 
proceed IFP is granted.  Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police 
Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 458 & nn.12-13 (3d Cir. 1996).  “Thus, 
submitting an in forma pauperis complaint to the clerk does not 
result in commencement of the litigation.”  Id. at 458 n.13; see 
also Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1998) (“His 
complaint was filed, and his action was ‘brought’ when his 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted.” (citing 
Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458; Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 
430 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990))); Oatess, 914 F.2d at 429 n.1 (“When a 
complaint is accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis, rather than by payment of a filing fee, the complaint is 
not docketed, and it is therefore not filed, until the motion has 
been granted.”).  However, “[w]e determined [in Urrutia] that, 
even though the limitations period ran out, ‘[t]his was not [his] 
fault[: h]e submitted his in forma pauperis complaint a full two 
months before the statute of limitations was due to expire.’”  
(Partial Dissent & Concurrence at 8 (quoting Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 
458).)  “Because of ‘the delay in making a § 1915(d) 
determination . . . we [held] that, once a plaintiff submits an in 
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forma pauperis complaint,’ the statute of limitations would be 
equitably tolled until the court grants the IFP application.”5  (Id. 
(quoting Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 459).)   
In contrast, this Court has, at least implicitly, indicated 
that we must look to the filing of the notice of appeal as the 
proverbial trigger for deciding whether dismissals count as 
strikes.  Tallying the plaintiff’s strikes, we observed in Ball that, 
out of the ten purported strikes, three of the dismissals did not 
count as strikes because they were not final “when Ball filed the 
appeals before us now.”6  Ball, 726 F.3d at 465.  “Three others 
do not count as strikes for present purposes because the actions 
were dismissed after these appeals were filed.”  Id. at 466 
(footnote omitted).  This Court had not yet ruled on Ball’s IFP 
motion; in fact, the Ball Court had to decide whether or not to 
grant her motion.  See, e.g., id. at 451.  We thereby clearly 
                                                 
5 Similarly, the issue in Oatess was whether a district 
court could dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte for failure 
to state a claim after the plaintiff was granted IFP status but 
before service of process occurred.  Oatess, 914 F.2d at 429.  
Addressing an appeal where the IFP motion was actually 
granted on the same day it was filed, Gibbs considered “the 
narrow question” of whether § 1915(g) requires the district court 
to revoke IFP status granted before the enactment of the PLRA.  
Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 162.   
6  We again note that the Supreme Court abrogated Ball 
in part, generally holding that “a prior dismissal . . . counts as a 
strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal.”  
Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1763.  But see id. at 1764-65 (refusing to 
resolve question of whether plaintiff would have three strikes if 
he or she were attempting to appeal from dismissal of third 
complaint).     
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meant that the discounted dismissals occurred after Ball filed his 
notices of appeal.  While we did not specifically discuss the 
issue now before us (and went on to conclude that Ball had three 
strikes at the time she commenced her appeals, id. at 466), Ball’s 
tallying of strikes clearly weighs in Millhouse’s favor.   
According to Appellees and Judge Ambro’s partial 
dissent and concurrence, the term “bring” under § 1915(g) refers 
to the time when an IFP motion is granted.  However, § 1915(g) 
distinguishes between “bring[ing] a civil action,” on the one 
hand, and “appeal[ing] a judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding,” on the other hand.  “The word ‘appeal’ does occur 
as the object of the verb ‘brought’ later in Section 1915(g), in 
reference to a prisoner having ‘brought an action or appeal’ on 3 
prior occasions and accrued strikes as a result” (Appellant’s 
Reply Brief at 4 n.3).  In O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit (in a majority opinion) rejected the 
theory that the prisoner’s prior actions were not “brought” under 
this subsequent language (and thereby could not constitute 
strikes under § 1915(g)) “because he merely filed applications 
for in forma pauperis status which were subsequently denied,” 
id. at 1151.  Significantly, it concluded that “a plaintiff has 
‘brought’ an action for the purposes of § 1915(g) when he 
submits a complaint and request to proceed in forma pauperis to 
the court.”  Id. at 1152.  Furthermore, this Court (sitting en 
banc) recognized that “the word ‘bring’ in this context plainly 
refers to the time when the civil action is initiated.”  Abdul-
Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313 (citing Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 162).  The 
courts thereby must consider if the prisoner is under imminent 
danger at the time the complaint is filed (as opposed to the time 
of the alleged incident).  Id. at 313-15.  Likewise, the Fifth 
Circuit explained that “we must determine if danger exists at the 
time the plaintiff seeks to file his complaint or notice of appeal 
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IFP.”  Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998) (per 
curiam) (emphasis in original).   
We believe that our approach is consistent with both 
legislative intent and basic principles of fairness.  Congress 
enacted the PLRA “to limit the filing of frivolous and vexatious 
prisoner lawsuits,” Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 314, and the 
Supreme Court has indicated that § 1915(g) did not create a 
“leaky filter,” Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1764.  Nevertheless, we 
find nothing to suggest that Congress designed the statutory 
scheme to penalize prisoners for “the delay inherent” in the 
process of disposing of their IFP motions, Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 
458 n.13.  After all, the disposition of an IFP motion is often “a 
time-consuming process” that is, in large part, outside of the 
control of the pro se litigant.  Id.  At the very least, the Court 
does need time to make an indigency determination and to 
screen the prisoner’s filing history for strikes.  In turn, IFP 
motions should not be treated differently based on how quickly 
this Court may dispose of them.  “To hold otherwise would . . . 
mean that similar in forma pauperis [motions] would be treated 
differently on the basis of how quickly [the Court] acted on 
them.”  Id. at 459.  In fact, the partial dissent and concurrence 
acknowledges that it would be overly prejudicial to bar 
Millhouse access to this Court given the present circumstances.  
“Millhouse filed a notice of appeal and an IFP request in May 
and June 2015, respectively; the Clerk’s Office took no action 
on the IFP request until it stayed the case five months later in 
November 2015 (pending the resolution of Sage); and 
[according to Judge Ambro] two strikes accrued during the 
Court’s delay and mandated stay of the proceedings.”  (Partial 
Dissent & Concurrence at 8.)  In other words, the purported 
second and third strikes “only accrued for the purposes of this 
17 
 
appeal due to our Court’s delay.”7  (Id.)   
Based on our ruling in Urrutia, the partial dissent and 
concurrence proceeded to “equitably consider the date of 
commencement for three-strikes purposes as June 15 (when 
Millhouse filed his IFP request) due to our Court’s delay.”  (Id. 
at 9.)  However, we question whether the equitable tolling 
doctrine (or similar concepts) could apply in this context.  This 
appeal (unlike Urrutia) does not really implicate a statute of 
limitations or some sort of time limit that may be “tolled.”  It is 
also, at the very least, questionable whether it is proper, on the 
one hand, to interpret the PLRA so that strikes accrued after the 
filing of the notice of appeal but before the Court grants the IFP 
motion generally trigger the three strikes rule while, on the other 
hand, concluding that these strikes do not “really count” based 
on our own assessment of the specific circumstances of the 
proceeding.  (See Oral Argument Transcript at 39-40 (“It could 
be an argument for equitable tolling.  But equitable tolling, 
under 1915, where Congress has stated that in no, in no case 
should an appeal proceed without the court authorizing 
commencement, that says to me that equitable tolling shouldn’t 
apply in that situation . . . .) (Counsel for Appellees).)  Instead, 
we read the statutory scheme—given the statutory language, 
                                                 
 7 In addition to the concerns of basic fairness articulated 
above, there is a practical obstacle to Appellees’ position that we 
should determine eligibility for IFP status on the date the Court 
rules on a prisoner’s motion to proceed IFP.  Appellees’ position 
would render such motions extremely time-sensitive.  That is, 
when the Court decides to grant IFP status, we would need to 
rule on the issue immediately.  If there was any lapse between 
the determination and the ruling, we would have to return to the 
issue and verify that IFP status was still warranted. 
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existing case law, the purposes of the legislation, and basic 
considerations of fairness—as requiring us to look to the date 
the notice of appeal is filed in assessing whether a dismissal 
counts as a strike.  Strikes accrued after this date simply do not 
count under § 1915(g).   
Because the second and third putative strikes accrued 
after Millhouse filed his notice of appeal, they could not count 
as strikes for purposes of this appeal.  Millhouse has only one 
strike and is eligible for IFP status on appeal.    
B. Heath II and Doe 
 Even if we were to count Doe and Heath II (which we do 
not), Millhouse would still only have two strikes—Bledsoe and 
Doe.  Accordingly, he is still eligible for IFP status on appeal.  
In Sage, we determined that Bledsoe (which accrued before the 
filing of his notice of appeal) qualifies as a strike.  Sage, 639 F. 
App’x at 793-94.  Because the District Court explicitly and 
correctly concluded that the complaint revealed an immunity 
defense on its face and dismissed with prejudice for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Doe also qualifies as a strike.  However, we 
adopt the Fourth Circuit’s approach in which a dismissal without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim does not rise to the level of 
a strike.  Under this rule, Heath II thereby does not qualify as a 
strike.     
Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court shall dismiss the case 
at any time if it determines that the action “fails to state a claim 
on which relief may be granted.”  In Ball, we held that a 
dismissal based on immunity does not constitute a strike, unless 
the district court “explicitly and correctly concludes that the 
complaint reveals the immunity defense on its face and 
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dismisses [with prejudice] the unexhausted complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6) or expressly states that the ground for the 
dismissal is frivolousness.”  Ball, 726 F.3d at 463 & n.20.  Ball, 
however, did not address a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
We now apply Ball to a complaint dismissed based on immunity 
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  As in Ball, such a dismissal is a 
strike only if the dismissal is with prejudice and the “court 
explicitly and correctly concludes that the complaint reveals the 
immunity defense on its face.”  Id.  at 463.  Millhouse asserts 
that Doe “was not ‘correct,’ and that under a liberal pleading 
standard he should have the opportunity to amend his complaint 
to include non-immune defendants” (specifically the prison 
officials who allegedly allowed inmates to access the Third 
Circuit opinion on the law library’s computers).  (Partial Dissent 
& Concurrence at 7.)  Purportedly, “you cannot ascertain from 
the face of the dismissal whether the district court evaluated if 
the pleading could be amended to state a claim against non-
immune defendants.”  (Oral Argument Transcript at 20 (Counsel 
for Appellant).)  In Doe, the District Court “explicitly” 
dismissed with prejudice Millhouse’s complaint for “‘fail[ure] to 
state a claim’” pursuant to “a statutory provision or rule that is 
limited solely to dismissals for [such a reason],” namely, § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Byrd, 715 F.3d at 126.  It did so because it 
“explicitly and correctly conclud[ed] that the complaint reveals 
the immunity defense on its face.”  Ball, 726 F.3d at 463 
(footnote omitted).  The three unidentified Third Circuit judges 
(the only persons to be named as defendants in the complaint) 
were entitled to absolute judicial immunity from monetary 
damages.  The District Court further explained that Millhouse 
failed to state a cognizable claim with respect to his additional 
request for injunctive relief (i.e., a transfer out of the federal 
prison system).  According to the District Court, it would be 
inequitable to grant him an opportunity to file an amended 
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complaint.  Noting that a prisoner has no justifiable expectation 
that he will be incarcerated in a particular prison, the District 
Court went on to explain that “[t]he complaint clearly fails to 
state a failure to protect claim.”  Doe, 2016 WL 727619, at *3.  
“Milhouse has not alleged any facts from which it could be 
concluded that prison officials failed to protect him.”  Id.  In 
fact, the District Court made it clear the complaint did not 
merely fail to state a claim under Bivens; “it describes neither 
conduct nor injury that implicates the Constitution or other 
federal law” (and service of process would thereby constitute a 
waste of increasingly scarce judicial resources).  Id. at *4.  “And 
if Millhouse takes umbrage with the District Court’s decision 
regarding his leave to amend, the appropriate path is to appeal 
that decision directly (which he has not done).”  (Partial Dissent 
& Concurrence at 7.)    
 In McLean, the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion 
considered at some length the question of “whether a dismissal 
without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike 
under § 1915(g).”  McLean, 566 F.3d at 394.  It held that “it 
does not.”  Id.  Appellees vigorously contest this holding, and, 
for our part, we agree with Judge Ambro that most circuits have 
indicated that such dismissals do qualify as strikes.  Orr v. 
Clements, 688 F.3d 463, 465-66 (8th Cir. 2002); Paul v. 
Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 704-06 (7th Cir. 2011); Smith v. 
Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 2011); 
O’Neal, 531 F.3d at 1154-55; Day v. Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 
667 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also McLean, 566 F.3d at 
402-10 (Shedd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit persuasively disposed of this 
contrary case law.  It noted, for instance, that the Tenth Circuit 
offered no analysis for its holding.  McLean, 566 F.3d at 398 
(addressing Day).  In O’Neal, the Ninth Circuit (in addition to 
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rejecting the prisoner’s theory that his prior actions were not 
“brought” by him because he merely filed IFP applications that 
were subsequently denied) concluded that a dismissal without 
prejudice may constitute a strike because there is nothing in the 
plain language of § 1915(g) distinguishing between dismissals 
with and dismissals without prejudice.  O’Neal, 531 F.3d at 
1154.  The McLean approach, however, is based on the actual 
language of the PLRA.  “[It] does not read an additional 
requirement into the statute that was not already implied by 
Congress’ use of the familiar phrase ‘dismissed . . . [for] 
fail[ure] to state a claim.’  An unqualified dismissal for failure to 
state a claim is presumed to operate with prejudice; the addition 
of the words ‘with prejudice’ to modify such a dismissal is 
simply not necessary.”  McLean, 566 F.3d at 398-99 (footnote 
omitted); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that PLRA employs language 
borrowed from Rule 12(b)(6)).  The PLRA, although not “a 
leaky filter,” Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1764, also does not use “a 
meat-axe approach” to achieve its goal of stemming the flood of 
frivolous prisoner litigation and conserving judicial resources, 
McLean, 566 F.3d at 398.   
 Furthermore, this Court’s own ruling in Ball clearly 
weighs in favor of McLean.  Even Appellees acknowledge that 
Ball “held that a dismissal based on the affirmative defense of 
failure to exhaust may be a strike when the applicability of the 
defense is clear from the face of the complaint and the dismissal 
is with prejudice.”  (Appellees’ Brief at 19-20.)  The Ball Court 
adopted the same “with prejudice” requirement with respect to 
dismissals based on the defendant’s immunity.  See Ball, 726 
F.3d at 463 n.20.  There would appear to be no real difference 
between a dismissal for failure to state a claim without prejudice 
and a dismissal of an unexhausted complaint without prejudice 
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(or a dismissal without prejudice on immunity grounds).  In the 
end, we thereby adopted (and expanded on) the Fourth Circuit’s 
line of reasoning:  
The second part of the rule requires that the 
dismissal based on failure to exhaust, pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), be with prejudice.  “We assume 
that Congress is aware of existing law when it 
passes legislation.”  Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 
[498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)], and Congress used the 
language of Rule 12(b)(6) in the PLRA’s three 
strikes provision.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (strike 
accrues on dismissal of an action that “fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted”). 
 A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) is presumed to be a judgment on the 
merits unless otherwise specified.  See Federated 
Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, [452 U.S. 394, 399 
n.3 (1981)] (“The dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)).  “It 
follows that the type of prior dismissal for failure 
to state a claim contemplated by § 1915(g) is one 
that constituted an adjudication on the merits and 
prejudiced the filing of a subsequent complaint 
with the same allegations.”  [McLean, 566 F.3d at 
396].  By contrast, a dismissal for failure to 
exhaust without prejudice is not an adjudication 
on the merits.  See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., [496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990)] (“[D]ismissal . 
. . without prejudice is a dismissal that does not 
operat[e] as an adjudication upon the merits. . . .” 
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(alterations in original) (citing and quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Consequently, a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim on exhaustion grounds without 
prejudice “does not fall within the plain and 
unambiguous meaning of § 1915(g)’s unqualified 
phrase “dismissed . . . [for] fail[ure] to state a 
claim’” and “does not count as a strike.”  
McLean, 566 F.3d at 397 (alterations in original). 
 The District Court did not state that any of the 
dismissals at issue in these appeals were without 
prejudice, and so they are presumed to be with 
prejudice, and they “operate[ ] as an adjudication 
on the merits.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
Id. at 460 n.17. 
 Appellees argue that Heath II constitutes a strike under 
McLean because the District Court expressly determined that 
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, which then acted as an adjudication on the merits when 
it denied leave to file an amended pleading.  (See also Partial 
Dissent & Concurrence at 6 (concluding that Heath II is strike 
because, by dismissing without leave to amend, it effectively 
barred Millhouse from filing subsequent complaint with same 
allegations).)   However, the District Court’s own order 
expressly dismissed the complaint without prejudice:  
“Milhouse’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”  Heath, 2015 WL 
6501461, at *5.  Even if the District Court may have 
inadvertently added this “without prejudice” language, it is not 
appropriate for us to treat a disposition including such 
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ambiguous (or even contradictory) language as a strike or to 
undertake a detailed analysis to ascertain what the District Court 
may have really meant to say.  After all, we adopted in Byrd a 
bright-line rule in deciding what constitutes a strike.  Byrd, 715 
F.3d at 126.  While this might mean “that a dismissal intended 
as a strike will slip through the cracks,” the Court will at least 
limit the likelihood of “more, and perhaps unnecessary, 
litigation on whether or not a particular dismissal constitutes a 
strike.”  Id.  We also note that prisoners, who typically act pro 
se, are entitled to take dismissals “at face value” and “should not 
be required to speculate on the grounds the judge could or even 
should have based the dismissal on.”  Paul, 658 F.3d at 706. 
C. The District Court’s IFP Ruling 
  Granting the motion to proceed IFP on appeal, we will 
vacate the District Court’s denial of Millhouse’s IFP motion and 
remand for further proceedings.  Appellees concede that, should 
we grant IFP status and reach the merits of the underlying 
District Court decision, this decision should be vacated.  With 
the exception of Bledsoe, the cases cited by the District Court do 
not constitute strikes under § 1915(g).  See Sage, 639 F. App’x 
at 793-95.  Millhouse had only one strike when he filed his 
complaint on August 22, 2014 (and when the District Court 
denied his motion to proceed IFP on May 4, 2015).   
IV. 
 We grant Millhouse’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal.  
We will vacate the District Court’s order denying his IFP 
motion and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.                                                     
 
Kareem Hassan Millhouse v. Lt. S.I.S. Susan V. Heath, et al. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in 
the judgment 
 I concur with the result set by my colleagues, but I 
take a different path in getting there.  I do so because I 
believe that the statutory language, and our comments on it, 
are clear that an in forma pauperis action begins under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915 when a court grants the IFP request and not 
when the appeal is filed.  Because we have not granted that 
request of Millhouse, we must determine if he has accrued 
two more strikes since his appeal.  Because he has, he 
normally would be barred from proceeding with IFP status in 
this appeal, as he has three strikes that typically forestall 
filing further claims absent paying full filing fees.  However, 
I believe our precedent in Urrutia v. Harrisburg County 
Police Department, 91 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 1996), controls this 
case and allows us to equitably toll the two strikes that 
Millhouse has accrued pending our decision as to his IFP 
request.  Thus, while I disagree with my colleagues’ 
interpretation of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”) and their conclusion that Heath II does not count 
as a strike, I agree that Millhouse only has one strike for the 
purpose of this appeal and thus his case should be remanded.   
DISCUSSION 
 A. An IFP Action Commences with the Grant of 
  IFP Status 
 
 Section 1915(g) provides  
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In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil 
action or appeal a judgment in a civil action 
or proceeding under this section if the 
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, 
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 
brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
United States that was dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, unless the prisoner is under 
imminent danger of serious physical injury.   
 
(emphases added).  Millhouse filed his notice of appeal on 
May 26, 2015 and his request for IFP status on June 15, 2015.  
His subsequent strikes accrued after those dates when his 
complaints were dismissed—October 27, 2015 and February 
24, 2016.  See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015) 
(strike accrues at dismissal).  So when did Millhouse “bring” 
this appeal under the meaning of the PLRA?  Was it May 26, 
2015 when he filed it, or has it not yet begun because we have 
not granted him IFP status?  This consideration sets up how to 
apply the three-strikes rule, as those strikes must constitute 
“prior occasions . . . that [were] dismissed.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g) (emphasis added).  If May 26, 2015 is the 
beginning date, the two strikes he has accrued since then 
cannot apply to bar him IFP status.  On the other hand, if this 
appeal has yet to begin because his request for IFP status is 
pending, then those two strikes trigger the three-strikes rule.  
 
 The answer, I believe, lies in § 1915(a), which creates 
the right to bring an IFP action.  It provides that “any court of 
the United States may authorize the commencement . . . of 
any suit, action, or proceeding, . . . or appeal therein, without 
any prepayment of fees,” brought by an indigent prisoner.  
The “authorize the commencement” language suggests that an 
IFP action is not “brought” under the PLRA simply by filing 
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a complaint or appeal.  Indeed, we have explained that 
because 
 
[o]nly the court may authorize the 
commencement of any suit without 
prepayment of fees[,] . . . submitting an in 
forma pauperis complaint to the clerk does 
not result in commencement of the litigation . 
. . [because] a determination of whether a 
prisoner has exceeded the allowable number 
of frivolous or other inadequate in forma 
pauperis actions will have to be made before 
the litigation may commence.   
 
Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458 n.13 (alterations and quotations 
omitted).  We have also indicated in a separate three-strikes 
case that the prisoner’s “action was ‘brought’ when his 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted.”  Gibbs v. 
Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1998); see Oatess v. 
Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 429 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (“When a 
complaint is accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis, rather than by payment of a filing fee, the complaint 
is not docketed, and it is therefore not filed, until the motion 
has been granted.”).  The reasoning is that an IFP action 
cannot possibly commence until a court both is able to make 
an “indigency determination” and screen the applicant’s filing 
history for three-strikes status.  See Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458 
n.13; see also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194-96 (3d Cir. 
1990) (explaining that § 1915 functions as a screening 
process for IFP applications).  If the IFP applicant passes this 
initial review as § 1915 requires, the request will be granted, 
the court will “authorize the commencement” of the suit or 
appeal, and the action or appeal then will be “brought.” To 
me the statute is clear as to this process.  
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 My colleagues believe that an IFP action on appeal 
begins on filing the notice of appeal.  But they hang their hat 
on § 1915(g), which does not exist in a vacuum.  Rather, 
§ 1915(a) is the statute’s subsection that establishes the right 
of an indigent prisoner to avail himself in federal court 
without paying the requisite filing fee.  It details the process 
of how such a prisoner can claim that right.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(a)(1) and (2) (a prisoner seeking IFP status shall 
submit “an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets 
such prisoner possesses . . . [and] the nature of the action, 
defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is 
entitled to redress,” as well as “a certified copy of the trust 
fund account statement . . . for the prisoner for the 6-month 
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or 
notice of appeal . . . .”).  Section 1915(g), on the other hand, 
merely establishes the three-strikes rule, which is nothing 
more than a limitation on who can claim that right.  There is 
no mention in the statute, and the majority points to none, that 
the three-strikes rule was intended to eclipse the procedural 
mandate of § 1915(a).  
 
 Subsection 1915(g) serves only to exclude serial filers 
from IFP-status eligibility, a determination that a court will 
make and, if favorable to the petitioner, then “authorize” the 
“commencement” of the IFP action under § 1915(a) if the 
applicant is not a three-strikes offender.  To hold otherwise 
makes § 1915(g) toothless: its purpose is to screen ineligible 
IFP applicants.  Yet the majority would have a potentially 
three-strikes-offending prisoner be able to initiate an action 
before that screening process was complete simply by filing a 
complaint or a notice of appeal.  That is inconsistent with 
both the purpose of § 1915(g) and Congress’s established 
process in claiming the right under § 1915(a).  Per the PLRA, 
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an IFP action begins when a court determines that an indigent 
prisoner seeking IFP-status is eligible to do so.1 
 
 B.  Millhouse Has Three Strikes 
 
 Thus, given that Millhouse’s appeal has yet to 
commence for IFP purposes because there has been no 
decision by this Court to grant him IFP status, we next must 
decide if he has accrued two additional strikes during the 
pendency of his IFP application.   
 
 The first questionable strike relates to the dismissal 
without prejudice of Millhouse’s complaint in Heath II.  
Millhouse claimed there that prison officials had violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights by housing him with a dangerous 
cellmate and failing to protect him.  Because Millhouse only 
alleged fear of possible future assault, and because that could 
not be the basis for relief, the District Court dismissed his 
complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim under 
the PLRA and also dismissed his claims without leave to 
amend (as amendment would be futile). 
 
 Millhouse argues, and the majority holds, that 
dismissal without prejudice cannot count as a strike under the 
PLRA.  Although most Circuits hold that there is no reason 
why a dismissal without prejudice should not count as a strike 
                                              
 1 The Majority also relies on the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure for its misreading of the PLRA.  That 
reasoning is odd, given that the PLRA (in both § 1915(a) and 
(g)) does not distinguish between when an IFP action can be 
brought in district court or appealed.  They are treated the 
same, and thus to base a holding on such a reading is out of 
place.  Moreover, the statute, not the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, controls.   
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because § 1915 makes no distinction between dismissals with 
or without prejudice—see, e.g., Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 
702, 705 (7th Cir. 2011); Orr v. Clements, 688 F.3d 463, 465 
(8th Cir. 2012); O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1313 
(10th Cir. 2011); see also Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 
F.3d 458, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1998); contra McLean v. United 
States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009) (dismissal without 
prejudice cannot count as a strike)—we need not decide that 
issue now.   
 
 The Heath II dismissal without prejudice was also 
without leave to amend.  If dismissal worthy of strike-status 
under the PLRA must “prejudice[] [the prisoner from] the 
filing of a subsequent complaint with the same allegations,” 
McLean, 566 F.3d at 396, isn’t dismissal without leave to 
amend the functional equivalent of dismissal with prejudice?  
Millhouse has no further recourse.  Thus, although any 
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) “is not a dismissal on the 
merits,” here it has “res judicata effect . . . for future in forma 
pauperis petitions.”  Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 
(1992).2  Put more simply, the Heath II dismissal effectively 
barred Millhouse from filing a “subsequent complaint with 
the same allegations,” and it is a strike even under the 
majority’s adoption of McLean’s reasoning.  
  
 The next questionable strike arises from the dismissal 
of Millhouse’s complaint in Doe, in which he filed an action 
against three unnamed Third Circuit judges for stating in an 
opinion that Millhouse had confessed to committing a crime 
and/or cooperated with the Government, and this public 
                                              
 2 Denton involved the application of former § 1915(d) 
of the PLRA, which was amended by Congress and is now 
currently § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
7 
 
exposure threatened his safety in prison.  The District Court 
dismissed with prejudice the complaint for failure to state a 
claim under the PLRA because the judges were entitled to 
absolute immunity in the exercise of their official duties.  See 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  It also determined that Millhouse’s 
additional claim for injunctive relief (that he not be housed in 
the particular prison he was placed) failed to state a claim 
under the PLRA and dismissed that claim with prejudice.  It 
then denied Millhouse leave to amend his complaint because 
that was futile. 
 
 Millhouse argues that Doe was not “correct,” and that 
under a liberal pleading standard he should have the 
opportunity to amend his complaint to include non-immune 
defendants.  He asserts he would have added the prison 
officials who allegedly allowed other inmates to access the 
relevant Third Circuit opinion on the computers in the 
prison’s law library.   
 
 This argument goes nowhere.  Although immunity is 
typically an affirmative defense that should be asserted in an 
answer, dismissal is nonetheless warranted in the PLRA 
context if the immunity defense is clear on the face of the 
complaint.  Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 463 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Here the District Court determined from the face of 
the complaint that the only named defendants were judicial 
officers sued in their official capacity who are entitled to 
absolute immunity.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 
355-56 (1978); Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 
F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2000).  And if Millhouse takes 
umbrage with the District Court’s decision regarding his 
leave to amend, the appropriate path is to appeal that decision 
directly (which he has not done).  Doe thus constitutes a 
strike. 
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 Accordingly, Heath II and Doe, in combination with 
Bledsoe (which we held to be a strike in Sage), are three 
qualifying strikes against Millhouse. 
 C.  Equitable Tolling of Millhouse’s Strikes  
 
 Although Millhouse has three strikes against him, it is 
overly prejudicial to bar him access to the Court given the 
particular facts of this appeal.  While the action has not yet 
begun because we have not granted Millhouse’s IFP 
application, we should consider the date he filed the appeal 
(or at least the request for IFP status).  The decision to grant 
or deny an IFP request is made at a court’s convenience, and 
thus substantial delay might ensue.   
 
 That is what happened here.  Millhouse filed a notice 
of appeal and an IFP request in May and June 2015, 
respectively; the Clerk’s Office took no action on the IFP 
request until it stayed the case five months later in November 
2015 (pending the resolution of Sage); and two strikes 
accrued during the Court’s delay and mandated stay of the 
proceedings.  That is, the latter two strikes only accrued for 
the purposes of this appeal due to our Court’s delay.    
 
 In Urrutia a prisoner filed his IFP request and 
complaint, no action was taken by the court, and then he 
sought to amend his complaint to add defendants even though 
by that time the statute of limitations had run.  91 F.3d 451.  
We determined that, even though the limitations period ran 
out, “[t]his was not [his] fault[: h]e submitted his in forma 
pauperis complaint a full two months before the statute of 
limitations was due to expire.”  Id. at 458.  Because of “the 
delay in making a § 1915(d) determination . . . we [held] that, 
once a plaintiff submits an in forma pauperis complaint,” the 
statute of limitations would be equitably tolled until the court 
grants the IFP application.  Id. at 459.  Thus Urrutia stands 
for the principle that, for the purposes of IFP actions, the date 
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they commence can be tolled when the applicant would 
otherwise be prejudiced.   
 Other Circuits have taken this approach.  See, e.g., 
Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 608 (4th Cir. 2010) (in an 
IFP case regarding overdue service of process, the Court held 
that “an in forma pauperis plaintiff should not be penalized 
for a delay caused by the court’s consideration of his 
complaint.  That delay is solely within the control of the 
district court.” (quotations omitted)); Donald v. Cook Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 557 n.5 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); 
Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1485 (10th Cir. 
1988) (in a non-prisoner IFP case, holding the “delay 
encountered while the district court determines a plaintiff’s 
financial eligibility under § 1915, or prepares a statement 
denying plaintiff’s in forma pauperis motion, could consume 
the entire limitations period”).  
 
 The same outcome should occur here.  Had our Court 
made a prompt (at least within five months) ruling on 
Millhouse’s IFP request or become aware more quickly of the 
substantial overlap between this case and Sage, the question 
of whether these later strikes apply would not be an issue.  
Accordingly, we should take the Urrutia approach, equitably 
consider the date of commencement for three-strikes purposes 
as June 15 (when Millhouse filed his IFP request) due to our 
Court’s delay, and rule that the strikes in Heath II and Doe do 
not apply to that request because they did not accrue prior to 
Millhouse making it. 
 
* * * * * 
 In summary, we should vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of Millhouse’s complaint under § 1915(g).  As we 
determined in Sage, the cases that the Court relied on to 
trigger the three-strikes rule are not actual strikes (with the 
exception of one, Bledsoe).  Although I believe Millhouse 
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now has three strikes moving forward, for the reasons noted 
above I concur with the judgment of the majority.   
